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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
ORLANDO F. ROYBAL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20560 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed 
by the Court on February 20, 1986. Originally, this case was 
an appeal from a conviction and judgment imposed for Possession 
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony of the 
Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1-3. 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 
ARGUMENT 
In its opinion, State v. Roybal, 28 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 
(filed February 20, 1986), this Court has misapprehended issues 
of fact and law. 
Mr. Roybal was convicted on the basis of evidence (a 
gun) discovered during a frisk by a police officer of Mr. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Roybal after Mr. Roybal had phoned police concerning a 
suspicious vehicle. 
The Court's opinion correctly states that, pursuant to 
statute , a peace officer may frisk a person for dangerous 
weapons when the officer reasonably believes he or another 
person is in danger. icl at 9. The opinion further states that 
before such a frisk can occur, the officer must have a 
reasonable belief that the person may be armed and dangerous 
and that the belief must be based on "specific and articulable 
facts." J[d. The opinion then enumerates seven facts which it 
claims were known to the officer in this case before he frisked 
Mr. Roybal. JEd. at 10. However, an examination of the record 
shows that no nexus existed between the officer's knowledge and 
the search of Mr. Roybal. In particular, the opinion is 
mistaken as to one critical fact — the officer's knowledge of 
the identity of the suspect before the frisk. 
The opinion states that the officer knew the identity 
of Mr. Roybal before the frisk because "4. Defendant 
approached the officer and identified himself as Orlando 
Roybal." The record does not support this conclusion. Officer 
Mitchell repeatedly testified, under questioning from defense 
counsel, the prosecutor, and Judge Wilkinson, that at the time 
of the frisk Mitchell had no idea that the man he was frisking 
was Orlando Roybal (T. 24,25,41). The State claims in its 
brief that Mr. Roybal identified himself before the frisk 
(State brief at 7-8). But according to the testimony of 
Officer Mitchell, this was not true. Officer Mitchell was 
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adamant that he did not know the identity of Mr, Roybal before 
he frisked Mr. Roybal. For example, the following exchange 
occurred between Judge Wilkinson and the officer: 
THE COURT: Let me just ask you Officer. 
As you approached the—as this individual 
approached you, you did not know him? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you did not know that he 
had been in jail? 
THE WITNESS: I had no idea who he was. 
(T. 41). 
The officer's knowledge of the identity of the suspect 
before the search is a critical factor in the determination of 
the legality of the search in this case. The officer's own 
testimony, supported by that of another officer at the scene 
(T. 55) clearly indicates he did not know the identity of the 
suspect at the time of the frisk. Therefore, the search was 
not justifiable as a search of a known, and suspected, 
dangerous person. Officer Mitchell's knowledge of facts 
regarding someone named "Orlando Roybal" was irrelevant to a 
consideration of the reasonableness of the frisk of a person 
the officer did not know to be Orlando Roybal. As far as the 
officer knew at the time of the frisk, the suspect was an 
unidentified stranger. Simply because an unidentified person 
is in the vicinity of an earlier wrong-doing is not sufficient 
reason to justify a warrantless frisk. State v. Swanigan, 699 
P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). 
Furthermore, as noted above, the Court's opinion 
correctly states that an officer must point to "specific and 
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articulable" facts in order to justify a frisk. In other 
words, an officer cannot base such a search on guesswork or 
hunches. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
In this case, the search of Mr. Roybal was a product 
of guesswork. The officer who conducted the search testified: 
Q. And those are the considerations 
that you took when you decided to do 
the pat down search; is that correct? 
A. For the most part, correct. 
Q. Was there anything else? 
A. Yes. But it was, again, sixth 
sense. Just a feeling. 
Q. Just a hunch on your part? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 28). 
The officer's testimony is clear — a hunch led to the frisk of 
Mr. Roybal. However, an officer's hunch is not enough to pass 
constitutional muster. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, at 
64 (1968) the Supreme Court stated: "The police officer is not 
entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the 
street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand 
on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have 
constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so." A 
hunch is not "constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds" to 
conduct a frisk. 
In conclusion, the State failed to justify a 
warrantless frisk of Mr. Roybal by the officer. The officer 
did not know the identity of the man he was frisking, a crucial 
factor. Further, the officer did not testify as to specific 
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and articulable facts which would warrant a frisk. Rather, a 
hunch formed the basis for the warrantless search. The trial 
court erred in refusing to suppress the fruits of that search. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court misapprehended critical issues in 
its decision in this case, the Appellant respectfully petitions 
this Court to reconsider that decision and reverse his 
conviction and remand his case for a new trial or dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of March, 1986. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this t day of March, 1986. 
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CERTIFICATION 
I, LYNN R. BROWN, do hereby certify the following: 
1. I am the attorney for 
appellant/petitioner in this case and; 
2. This Petition for Rehearing is presented 
to this Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this 
case. 
Respectfully submitted this ,-•;' day of March, 1986. 
O 
{' 'ftx--"— 
LiNN R. BROWN 
Attorney/Petitioner 
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